Abstract. In this paper, we study a nonzero-sum stochastic differential game of bang-bang type in the Markovian framework. We show the existence of a Nash equilibrium point for this game. The main tool is the notion of backward stochastic differential equations which, in our case, are multidimensional with discontinuous generators with respect to z component.
In the case when J 1 (u, v) + J 2 (u, v) = 0, the game turns into the well-known zerosum differential game which is widely studied in the literature (see e.g. [7, 8, 9, 18, 19] , etc. and the references therein). On the other hand, if X u,v does not depend on v then the problem turns merely into a control problem. In this specific case, we know that an optimal control exists and is of bang-bang type since it takes values only on the boundaries of U according to the derivative of the value function of the control problem. This is the consequence of the fact that the instantaneous reward in (1.2) is null. So one would expect the same features of the NEP of this game if it exists.
The nonzero-sum differential game is also considered by several authors in the literature, see eg. [4, 5, 10, 12, 31, 16, 20, 21, 22, 26, 27, 11] , to name a few. There are typically two approaches. One method is related to partial differential equation (PDE) theory. Some of the results show that the payoff function of the game is the unique viscosity solution of a related Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equation, e.g., [26] . Other works make use of the Sobolev theory of PDEs (see [4, 5, 16, 27] , etc.) to deal with NZSDGs. Comparatively, another popular way to deal with stochastic differential game is the backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE) approach [20, 21, 22, 26] , which characterizes the payoffs of the game through solutions of associated BSDEs. However those BSDEs are of multidimensional type and usually their generators are non-Lipschitz. Therefore proving that they have solutions is not an easy task.
In the present article, we study the above NZSDG via the BSDE arguments in the Markovian framework. For clarity reasons we consider a special game model in assuming that:
(i) the process X of (1.1) is R-valued, and U = [0, 1], V = [−1, 1] ; (ii) the drift Γ of (1.1) has the following structure:
Γ(t, x, u, v) = f (t, x) + u + v.
The conditions on the functions f and g i , i = 1, 2, are rather weak since they are related to measurability and growth conditions. At the end of the paper we give hints which allow to generalize this setting in several directions, especially if the dynamics contains a diffusion term and the multidimensional case for the process X u,v .
In this problem the main difficulty is lodged at the level of the main BSDE (2.11) associated with this NZSDG. Once the existence of its solution is stated, it provides the NEP of the game. As pointed out previously, this BSDE is of multidimensional type (here of dimension two since there are two players) and whose generator is discontinuous in z. The main challenge we overcome is to show that this BSDE has a solution and then we constructed a NEP for the game defined by (1.1), (1.2) and (i)-(ii) above. Like in the control framework, this NEP is of bang-bang type since the payoffs have no instantaneous payoffs included. This is the main novelty of this article. The closest work to ours is the one by P.Manucci [27] , but this latter concerns only diffusions in bounded domains and the requirements on the regularity of the data are stronger than ours due to the method she employed based on PDEs in Sobolev spaces.
This paper is organized as follows:
In Subsection 2.1, we introduce the game problem and some preliminaries. The formulation we adopt is of weak type. Besides, for intuitive understanding, we work with a particular setting of controls and state process X u,v . The extension to the multidimensional situation obviously holds following the same ideas. The explicit form of discontinuous controls, namely, bang-bang controls are presented in Subsection 2.2. In Subsection 2.3, we give the main result (Theorem 2.6) of this work and some other related important results. We first provide a link between the game problem and Backward SDEs (Proposition 2.3). The payoff of the game can be characterized by the initial value of the solution for an associated BSDE. Then, by Proposition 2.4, we prove that the existence of a NEP for the game is equivalent to the existence of a solution of a BSDE which is of multidimensional and with discontinuous generator with respect to z. Finally, under some reasonable assumption, we provide the solution of this special BSDE (Theorem 2.5). All the proofs are stated in Subsection 2.4. The proofs of Propositions 2.3 and 2.4 are standard. For Theorem 2.5, the method is mainly based on an approximating scheme. In Section 3, we investigate some possible generalizations. The idea is the same with a bit modification which is indicated.
2. Bang-bang type NZSDG and multidimensional BSDEs with discontinuous generators. In this section, we first deal with the bang-bang type nonzerosum stochastic differential game problem in 1-dimensional framework. A more general setting will be given in the next section.
2.1. Statement of the problem. Let T > 0 be fixed and let (Ω, F , P) be a probability space, on which is defined a 1-dimensional standard Brownian motion B := (B t ) t≤T . For t ≤ T , let us set F t := σ(B u , u ≤ t) and denote by (F t ) t≤T the completion of (F t ) t≤T with the P-null sets of F . Next let P be the σ-algebra on [0, T ] × Ω of F t -progressively measurable sets. For a real constant p ≥ 1, we introduce the following spaces:
• L p = {ξ : F T -measurable and R-valued random variable s.
We consider, in this article, the 2-player case which we describe accurately below. The general multiple players case is a straightforward adaptation.
Let (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R and X t,x be the stochastic process defined as follows:
Remark 2.1. Note that we consider a trivial situation for SDE (2.1) with an identity diffusion process, just for easy understanding. The trick of the technique in this article still valid for general diffusion process with appropriate properties. We will introduce this point in Section 3.
Each player π i , i = 1, 2, has her own control. Let us denote next by U = [0, 1], V = [−1, 1] those two compact subsets of R and M 1 (resp. M 2 ) the set of Pmeasurable process u = (u t ) t≤T (resp. v = (v t ) t≤T ) on [0, T ] × Ω with value in U (resp. V ). Hereafter, we call M := M 1 × M 2 (resp. M 1 , resp. M 2 ) the set of admissible controls for the two players (resp. first player ; resp. second player).
Let f : (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R → R be a Borelian function. We will say that f is of linear growth if there exists a constant C ≥ 0 such that for any (t,
Next let Γ be the function such that for any (t,
The function Γ stands for the drift of the dynamics of the system when controlled by the two players π i , i = 1, 2. When f is of linear growth, the function Γ is so since U and V are bounded sets.
Next for (u., v.) ∈ M, let P u,v t,x be the positive measure on (Ω, F ) defined as follows:
t,x , u., v.))dP with ζ s (Θ) :
for any P-measurable R-valued process Θ := (Θ s ) s≤T . It follows from the uniform linear growth property of Γ that P u,v t,x is a probability on (Ω, F ) (see Appendix A of [14] or [25] , pp.200). Then, by Girsanov's Theorem ( [17] ), the process
As a matter of fact, the process X t,x is not adapted with respect to the filtration generated by the Brownian motion B u,v . Thereby, X t,x is a weak solution for the SDE (2.4). If the system starts from x 0 ∈ R at t = 0 and is controlled by player π 1 (resp. π 2 ) with u. (resp. v.), the law of its dynamics is the same as the one of X 0,x0
Once more let x 0 ∈ R fixed. We will precise the payoffs of the players when they implement the pair of strategies (u., v.). It is of terminal type and given, for player π 1 (resp. π 2 ), by
where: (i) g 1 and g 2 are two Borel measurable functions from R to R which are of polynomial growth, i.e., there exist non-negative constants C and γ ≥ 1 such that for any x ∈ R,
t,x is the expectation under the probability P
As we can see from (2.4) and (2.5), the choice of control of each player has influence on the other one's payoff through the state process X 0,x0 under P u,v x0 . What we discussed here is a nonzero-sum stochastic differential game which means that the two players are of cooperate relationship. Both of them want to reach the maximum payoff. Therefore, naturally, we are concerned with the existence of a Nash equilibrium point, which is a couple of controls (u * , v * ) ∈ M, such that, for all (u, v) ∈ M,
This means that when the strategy (u * , v * ) is implemented by the players, one who makes unilaterally the decision to deviate or to change a strategy, while the other one keeps its own choice, is penalized.
2.2. Bang-bang type control. As pointed out in (2.5), there are no instantaneous payoffs in J 1 and J 2 . Therefore, in comparison with optimal control which is a particular case of our problem (see e.g. [2, 3, 13, 28] ), the equilibrium point of this game, if exists, should be of bang-bang type, i.e., the optimal control u * (resp.v * ) will jump between the two bounds of the value set U (resp.V ).
To proceed, let H 1 and H 2 be the Hamiltonian functions of this game problem, i.e., the functions (which do not depend on ω) defined from [0, T ] × R × R × U × V into R by:
Next let ǫ 1 and ǫ 2 be two arbitrary elements of U and V respectively. Letū and v be two functions defined on R × U and R × V , valued on U and V respectively, as follows: ∀p, q ∈ R,
Then, we can easily check thatū andv satisfy the generalized Isaacs' condition which reads as follows:
Remark 2.2. Let us notice that the function H * 1 (resp. H * 2 ) does not depend on ǫ 1 (resp. ǫ 2 ) since, pū(p, ǫ 1 ) = p ∨ 0 (resp. qv(q, ǫ 2 ) = |q|) does not depend on ǫ 1 (resp. ǫ 2 ). Besides, they are discontinuous w.r.t. (p, q) sincev andū are so.
We next give the main result of this article without proofs for intuitive understanding. All the proofs are given in Subsection 2.4.
Main result.
As in several papers on the same subject ( [14, 20, 23] , etc.), we will adopt the BSDE approach in order to show that this particular nonzero-sum stochastic differential game has a Nash equilibrium point. For sake of clarity, in this subsection we give the main result and the intermediary ones which we need. We collect all their proofs in the next subsection. To begin with, the following result characterizes the payoffs (2.5) through a solution of a multidimensional BSDE. Proposition 2.3. Assume that (2.2) and (2.6) are satisfied. Then for all (u, v) ∈ M and i = 1, 2, there exists a unique pair of P-measurable processes (Y i;x0;u,v , Z i;x0;u,v ), with values in R × R, such that:
(ii) (2.10)
The following result is a verification theorem for the existence of NEP of the game of bang-bang type.
Proposition 2.4. Assume that (2.2) and (2.6) are satisfied. Besides, suppose that there exist two deterministic functions η 1 , η 2 and stochastic processes (
and θ, ϑ such that: (i) (a) θ (resp. ϑ) is a P-measurable process with values in U (resp. V ) and (Y 1 , Z 1 ) and (Y 2 , Z 2 ) are two couples of P-measurable processes R 1+1 -valued which satisfy:
s≤T is ds-square integrable and for all s ≤ T ,
(ii) η 1 and η 2 are two deterministic measurable functions with polynomial growth
s≤T is a bang-bang type Nash equilibrium point of the nonzero-sum stochastic differential game.
Finally since the diffusion coefficient in equation (2.1) is equal to the identity and in using a result by El-Karoui et al. [15] which allows the representation of solutions of BSDEs through deterministic functions, in the markovian case of randomness, we prove the existence of processes and deterministic functions which satisfy the requirements of Proposition 2.4. The main difficulty relies on the discontinuity of the generator H * 1 (resp. H * 2 ) w.r.t. (p, q) which comes from the discontinuity ofv (resp. u) on q = 0 (resp. p = 0). However we can overcome this difficulty and we have:
Theorem 2.5. Assume that f and g i , i = 1, 2, satisfy to (2.2) and (2.6) respectively. Then there exist
and θ, ϑ which satisfy (i),(a)-(b) and (ii) of Proposition 2.4.
As a consequence of Theorem 2.5 and Proposition 2.4, we obtain the main result of this article.
s≤T of M is a bang-bang type Nash equilibrium point for the nonzero-sum stochastic differential game defined by (2.1), (2.3) and (2.5).
Proofs.
2.4.1. Pre-results. We would like to introduce first two estimates about the process X t,x defined in (2.1) which will be used in order to prove the above results. They are related to moments of X t,x under the probabilities P and P u,v , (u, v) ∈ M (see. Karatzas, I.1991 [25] , pp.306). Indeed we have:
and for any (u, v) ∈ M (2.13)
Finally let us recall the following important result by U.G.Hausmann (see Theorem 2.2, pp.14 [24] ) related to the integrability of the exponential local martingale defined by (2.3). Lemma 2.7. ( [24] , pp.14) Let Θ be a P ⊗ B(R)-measurable application from [0, T ] × Ω × R to R which is of uniformly linear growth, that is, P-a.s.
Then, there exist constants p ∈ (1, 2) and C, where p depends only on C 0 while the constant C, depends only on p, but not on Θ, such that:
where the process ζ T (.) is the density function defined by (2.3).
As a by-product we have:
Proof of Proposition 2.3.
We will prove this Proposition by constructing the candidate solution of BSDE (2.10) directly. Then we check by Itô's formula that, the process defined is exactly the solution we anticipate. In this proof, Corollary 2.8 plays an important role. Let us illustrate it for player π 1 . The same can be done for player π 2 .
For simplicity, only in this proof, we use the notation (
For any (u, v) ∈ M, let us define the process (Y u,v s ) s≤T as follows:
This process is well defined by noticing that, for any constant q ≥ 1, we have E
< ∞ which is obtained by (2.6) and (2.13). For writing convenience, we denote by ζ s , the function ζ s (Γ(., X 0,x0 . , u . , v . )) as mentioned in (2.3). Therefore (2.14) can be transformed into:
In the following, we show that ζ T · g 1 (X 0,x0 T ) ∈ Lq for someq ∈ (1, 2). Indeed, according to Corollary 2.8, there exists some p 0 ∈ (1, 2), such that ζ T ∈ L p0 (dP). Therefore, for anyq ∈ (1, p 0 ), Young's inequality leads to:
, which is obviously finite by the polynomial growth of g 1 and (2.12). Therefore the process Y u,v is defined. On the other hand, by Doob's inequality, (2.6) and estimate (2.13) we have:
Next thanks to representation Theorem of martingales ( [32] , pp.199) applied to the process (E[ζ T · g 1 (X 0,x0 T )|F s ]) s≤T , there exists a P-measurable and R-valued process (∆ s ) s≤T which satisfies E[(
As for any s ∈ [0, T ], 
is the trivial σ-algebra completed with the P-null sets of F and taking into account that P and P u,v x0 are equivalent probabilities. Therefore taking into account of (2.15) and using the Burkholder-DavisGundy inequality we have
This and (2.15) imply the estimate (2.9) of Proposition 2.3 for q > 1. Finally for q = 1, (2.9) is obviously true since it is valid for any q > 1. The proof of the Proposition 2.3 is completed. 
The control (u,v) is admissible and thanks to Proposition 2.3, there exists a pair of P-measurable processes (Y 1;x0;u,v , Z 1;x0;u,v ) such that for any q > 1, For k ≥ 0, we define the stopping time τ k as follows: 
Thus equation (2.18) can be simplified into:
where
By definition of the stopping time τ k , we have E u,v x0
Next taking into account (2.13) and the fact that Y 1 has a representation through X 0,x0 and η 1 (s, y), (s, y) ∈ [0, T ]×R, a deterministic function with polynomial growth, we have 
Similarly, we can show that, Henceforth (ū,v) is a Nash equilibrium point for the NZSDG.
2.4.4.
Proof of Theorem 2.5. The proof will be split into several steps. Firstly, we construct an approximating sequence of BSDEs with continuous Lipschitz generators by smoothing the functionsū andv. Next we provide appropriate uniform estimates of the solutions of the approximating scheme. Finally we show that the approximating scheme contains at least a convergent subsequence which provides the stochastic processes and deterministic functions verifying the requirements of Proposition 2.4.
Step 1 : Approximating scheme.
At the beginning of this proof, we would like to clarify that the functions p ∈ R → pū(p, ǫ 1 ) and q ∈ R → qv(q, ǫ 2 ) are uniformly Lipschitz for any ǫ 1 and ǫ 2 , since pū(p, ǫ 1 ) = pū(p, 0) = sup u∈U pu and qv(q, ǫ 2 ) = qv(q, 0) = sup v∈V qv. Hereafter u(p, 0) (resp.v(q, 0)) will be simply denoted byū(p) (resp.v(q)).
Next for integer n ≥ 1, letū n andv n be the functions defined as follows:
Note thatū
n andv n are Lipschitz in p and q respectively. Roughly speaking, they are the approximations ofū andv. Below, let Φ n be the truncation function x ∈ R → Φ n (x) = (x ∧ n) ∨ (−n) ∈ R, which is bounded by n. Now for (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R and n ≥ 1, we consider the following BSDE of dimension two, with Lipschitz generator: For any s ≤ T , (2.21)
From Pardoux-Peng's result ( [29] ), for any n ≥ 1, this equation has a unique solution (Y i,n;t,x , Z i,n;t,x ) ∈ S Moreover, for n ≥ 1 and i = 1, 2, the functions η i,n verify:
with, for any (s,
Step 2 : Estimates for processes (Y i,n;t,x , Z i,n;t,x ), i = 1, 2.
In order to show the needed uniform estimates for Y i,n;t,x of BSDE (2.21), we use comparison. For that let us consider the following BSDE: For i = 1, 2 and any This constant exists since f is of linear growth andū,v,ū n andv n are uniformly bounded. Observing now that the application z ∈ R → Φ n (C(1 + |X t,x r |))|z| + C|z| is Lipschitz continuous, therefore the solution (Ȳ i,n ,Z i,n ) of the above BSDE (2.25) exists in the space S 2 T (R) × H 2 T (R) and is unique. Note that we have omitted the dependence w.r.t (t, x) of (Ȳ i,n ,Z i,n ) in order to alleviate notations as there is no possible confusion. On the other hand by the standard comparison theorem of solutions of BSDEs ( [15] , pp.46, Theorem 4.1) one has (2.27)Ȳ i,n ≥ Y i,n;t,x , P − a.s.
Next provided that we show uniform estimates, w.r.t. n, forȲ i,n , then estimates for Y i,n;t,x will be an immediate consequence. Below, we will focus on the properties of Y i,n .
Using again the result by El Karoui et al. yields that, there exist deterministic
Next let us consider the process
, which is, thanks to Girsanov's Theorem, a Brownian motion under the probability P i,n on (Ω, F ) whose density with respect to P is ζ T {[Φ n (C(1 + |X In view of (2.28), we obtain,
where E i,n is the expectation under probability P i,n . By taking the expectation on both sides of the above equation under the probability P i,n and consideringη i,n (t, x) is deterministic, we arrive at,
As the functions g i , i = 1, 2, verify the polynomial growth condition (2.6) and for any s ≤ T ,
then by estimate (2.13) we have, for some constant λ ≥ 0 and C a constant which does not depend on n,
Therefore by (2.27) we obtain
In a similar way, we can show that
are of polynomial growth with respect to (t, x) uniformly in n.
To conclude this step, we have the following results: There exists a constant C independent of n and t, x such that, for
(b) by the combination of (a), (2.12) with (2.22), it holds:
straightforward result by using Itô's formula with (Y i,n;t,x ) 2 and using (b).
Step 3 : Convergence of a subsequence of (Y i,n;0,x , Z i,n;0,x ) n≥1 , i = 1, 2. dy for any s ∈ (0, T ]. Let q ∈ (1, 2) be fixed. We are going to show that the sequence (H
(C is a generic constant whose value may change from line to line). The last inequality is obtained from the fact that E[ T 0 |Z i,n;0,x0 s | 2 ds] ≤ C and estimate (2.12). As a result, there exists a subsequence {n k } (still denoted by {n} for simplification) and two B([0, T ] × R)-measurable deterministic functions H i (s, y), i = 1, 2, such that,
Next we focus on passing from the weak convergence to strong sense convergence by proving that (η i,n (t, x)) n≥1 defined in (2.23) is a Cauchy sequence for each (t,
o.g we assume t < T ), δ > 0, k, n and m ≥ 1 be integers. From (2.23), we have,
We first deal with the first term of the right-hand side of (2.32). By Hölder's inequality, definition of H n i (s, X t,x s ) and (2.29) we have
≤ Cδ We now focus on the third term of the right hand-side of inequality (2.32). In the same way as previous we have:
by using Markov inequality. Finally we deal with the second term of the right-hand side of (2.32). By using the law of X t,x s
we have
which is bounded when s ∈ [t + δ, T ] and |y| ≤ k and then
withq is the conjugate of q. Now as the sequence of functions (H
Henceforth for i = 1, 2, and any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R, the sequences (η i,n (t, x)) n≥1 is of Cauchy type and then converges to a deterministic measurable function η i (t, x). Additionally from the uniform polynomial growth of η i,n (see (a) of
Step 2) we deduce that η i is also of polynomial growth, i.e., (2.34)
Next it turns out that, for i = 1, 2 and any Consequently, for i = 1, 2, the sequence (Z i,n;0,x0 = (ς i,n (t, X 0,x t )) t≤T ) n≥1 is convergent in H To summarize this step, we have the following results (at least for a subsequence {n}):
Step 4 : Convergence of (H n i ) n≥1 , i = 1, 2. In this step, we are going to define the processes (θ s ) s≤T and (ϑ s ) s≤T and verify that (Y i , Z i ), i = 1, 2, and θ, ϑ satisfy (2.11). We demonstrate first for i = 1. Let us consider the subsequence which satisfies (2.39).
Recall (2.24) for (t, x) = (0, x 0 ) which reads as: For any s ∈ [t, T ],
Note that,
since Z 1,n;0,x0 → n→∞ Z 1 , ds ⊗ dP-a.e. as stated in (2.39)-(c), Φ n (x) → n→∞ x and finally by the continuity of p ∈ R → pū(p). This convergence holds also in H 
since for any z = 0, if n is large enough thenv 
n is uniformly bounded. To proceed let us define a P-measurable process (ϑ s ) s≤T valued on V as the weak limit in
The weak limit exists since (v n k ) k≥0 is bounded. Let now τ be an arbitrary stopping time such that
On the right side, the first integral converges to 0 in L 2 (dP) by Lebesgue's dominated convergence theorem since
, the sequence (v n k ) k≥0 is bounded and |Φ n k (x)| ≤ |x|, ∀x ∈ R. Below, we will give the weak convergence in
That is, for any random variable ξ ∈ L 2 (Ω, F T , dP), we need to show,
Thanks to martingale representation theorem, there exists a process
The latter one on the right side is 0, since
T (R) and the boundness ofv n k and then
For the former part, let us denote s 0 Λ u dB u by ψ s for any s ∈ [0, τ ]. Then for any integer κ > 0, we have,
On the right side of the above equation, the first component converges to 0 which is the consequence ofv n k (Z [25] ). Moreover σ satisfies the uniform elliptic condition, i.e. there exists a constant Υ > 0 such that for any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R, Υ ≤ σ(t, x) 2 ≤ Υ −1 .
In this framework, the Hamiltonian functions associated with the NZSDG of payoffs given by (2.5) are defined from [0, T ] × R × R × U × V into R by:
H 1 (t, x, p, u, v) := pσ −1 (t, x)Γ(t, x, u, v) = pσ −1 (t, x)(f (t, x) + u + v); H 2 (t, x, q, u, v) := qσ −1 (t, x)Γ(t, x, u, v) = qσ −1 (t, x)(f (t, x) + u + v).
Noticing that σ −1 is bounded, it follows by the generalized Isaacs' condition (2.8) and the same approach in this article that, the Nash equilibrium point exists and is of bang-bang type. Actually we should point out that, all the results in this article will hold by the same techniques in this case (ii) with only some minor adaptions, except the convergence to 0 of the second term on the right side of inequality (2.32) which needs to be checked carefully. Indeed the objective is to show that s . Under Assumption (A1) on σ, for anyq ∈ (1, ∞), the family of laws {µ(t, x; s, dy), s ∈ (t, T ]} is Lq-dominated by {µ(0, x 0 ; s, dy), s ∈ (t, T ]}, i.e., for any δ ∈ (0, T − t), there exists an application φ The constant q in (3.3) is the one which makes that H n i (s, y) → n→∞ H i (s, y) weakly in L q ([0, T ] × R; µ(0, x 0 ; s, dy)ds) for i = 1, 2 and a fixed q ∈ (1, 2). Then combining this weak convergence result and (3.3) yields (3.2).
(iii) In the same way one can deal with the multi-dimensional case for diffusion processes X t,x satisfying (3.1) when σ(t, x) verifies Assumption (A1).
